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This paper analyses the effects of the recent Arab uprisings on tourism destinations 
located along the Mediterranean coastline. It uses time-series analysis to model 
international tourist arrivals. First, autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) 
models are estimated for the period 1980-2009 and predicted for 2010-2014 to establish 
suitable country controls. Second, Bayesian Structural Time-Series models - designed 
primarily to determine causal impacts in on-line marketing campaigns - are used to 
establish the effects of the events in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Spain and 
Greece. The main conclusion is that the models clearly capture the negative impact of 
the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt and their positive impacts on Morocco and Turkey. 
However, the effects on Spain and Greece are less clear and depend crucially on the set 




Inspired by the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, a frustrated, impoverished 
fruit vendor whose merchandise was confiscated by authorities, Tunisians took to the 
streets in December 2010 in a campaign of civil resistance dubbed ‘Jasmine Revolution’ 
to protest against the autocracy, corruption, and inequality of the Ben Ali regime. The 
success of protests in Tunisia inspired people in other Arab countries to rise up against 
their autocratic rulers in what became known as the Arab Spring (Alexander, 2012).  
Undoubtedly, the uprisings of the ‘Arab Spring’ fostered important political changes in 
the region, including the overthrow of well-established leaderships and autocrats in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, or the response to some social pressure of 
Governments of Morocco, Algeria and Jordan. Pero este proceso también se ha 
acompañado de inestabilidad y duros enfrentamientos entre gobierno y ciudadanos. La 
Guerra civil de Siria es el episodio más dramatico desde el punto de vista humanitario, 
aunque en este caso la Primavera Árabe es solo un episodio más de un conflicto con 
tintes geopolíticos, y que sirve como caldo de cultivo del terrorismo islámico. Por este 
motivo, en lo sucesivo utilizaremos el término Arab uprisings o simplemente uprisings 
para referirnos a estos eventos. 
From an economic viewpoint, la inestabilidad que siguió a the Arab Spring uprising had 
a significant impact on economic activity in North Africa. According to Deutsche Bank 
Research (2013) in the short-run, average real GDP growth in the region fell from 4.2% 
in 2010 to 2.2% in 2011, its lowest level in a decade. The slowdown affected hardest in 
countries that were at the center of the uprisings, such as Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria 
and Yemen. Only Morocco maintained a low growth in its GDP during 2011. In 2013 
the GDP growth rates remained below the pre-revolutionary levels.  
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Obviously, esta etapa de inestabilidad también ha tenido su reflejo en el turismo, una 
industria en la que safety and security are main determinants of competitiveness (Dwyer 
& Kim, 2003). In fact, wars, terrorism and economic crisis, instead of natural disasters 
are key factors in so-called “tourism crisis”, defined by the Pacific Asia Travel 
Association as “a disaster, whether natural or man-made, that has the potential to totally 
disrupt the tourism industry” (Perles et. al, 2013).   
As a result, the number of tourist arrivals in the five main destinations in the region –
Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Lebanon – fell considerably - the decline was 
most severe in Egypt and Tunisia, by about 40% each -, y al mismo tiempo se ha 
reducido la inversion extranjera internacional en el sector. 
According to Mansfeld and Winckler (2015), terrorism and other causes (like the 
absence of empathy with the current political regimes, or the lack of available foreign 
aid to re-activate tourism flows) have alarmed European tourists, many of whom have 
retreated to the north shore of the Mediterranean and Dubai for their holidays. 
Ante estos hechos, en this paper se pretende to study the impact of the uprisings and la 
posterior inestabilidad política on the tourism flows, determining if there are winners 
and losers in Mediterranean touristic countries. To do that, we will take Egypt, Greece, 
Morocco, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey and will use Bayesian Structural Time-Series 
models proposed by Brodersen et al. (2015). This methodology allows us to infer the 
causal impact based on a diffusion-regression state-space model that predicts the 
counterfactual market response in a synthetic control that would have occurred had no 
intervention taken place. 
Instead of crises in tourism have been deeply studied, to our knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to determine the impact of the Arab uprisings on tourism using econometric 
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methods that go beyond descriptive time series analysis. Apart of that, this research is 
innovative in three ways: (1) considers a broader period of analysis, (from 2010 to 
2014), than previous studies (see for example Beck, 2014) estimating the immediate 
effects of the Arab Spring , (2) it seeks to estimate the impact of these events on tourist 
arrivals by adapting a methodology designed to capture causality using observational 
data, and (3) finally, it introduces a discussion about the most suitable set of country 
controls needed to estimate causal impacts on tourism.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Sections two and three review the existing literature on 
tourism crisis and terrorism, and study the evolution of tourism in the Mediterranean 
Arabian countries during the last decades. Section four describes the methodology and 
data. Section five deals with the econometric analysis. Section six presents the 
conclusions as well as the limitations of the analysis performed.  
2.-Literature review. 
Crises and their management constitute a popular topic for tourism researchers, and 
many studies on the characteristics of crises and the action taken to overcome them have 
been carried out (Henderson, 1999). Hall (2010) summarizes various types of tourism 
crises and explores their treatment by tourism researchers pointing out that crises with 
respect to international tourism are usually interrelated with other crisis events in 
economics and finance, politics and energy. Thus, research on economic crisis has 
tended to go hand-in-hand with major regional and global periods of recession and 
downturn in international tourism. 
A successful tourism industry needs political stability, peace, security, and the potential 
for intercultural dialogue between groups of people without mental or physical 
restrictions (Al-Hamarneh & Steiner, 2004). Poor personal security arising from violent 
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protests, social unrest, civil war, terrorist actions, and violation of human rights or only 
a threat of these actions may have negative effects on the tourist industry (Hall & 
O’Sullivan, 1996). The large amount of existing literature is logical due to the relevance 
of the topic (Ritcher & Waugh, 1986). 
Singh (2013) surveys the existing literature distinguishing between authors analyzing 
the economic impact of terrorism (Enders & Sandler, 1991; Enders, Sandler & Parise, 
1992), authors studying the impact of political instability or war on tourism (e.g. 
Gartner & Shen, 1992; Mansfeld and Kliot, 1996; Mihalic, 1996; Ritcher, 1980; 1989; 
Schwartz, 1991; Scott, 1988; Smith, 1996; Teye, 1986) and authors focusing on the 
implications for tourism marketing and crisis management (e.g. Buckley and Klemm, 
1993; Conant, Clarck, Burnett & Zank, 1988; D’Amore and Anuza, 1986; Hollier, 
1991; Hurley, 1988; Sönmez, Backman & Allen, 1994). An analysis of the above 
studies reveals that terrorists target tourists in order to destabilize the economic health 
of a destination and to grab media attention. Gaining a political advantage over the 
government by reducing their earnings of foreign exchange constitutes a further reason 
behind targeting tourist destinations (Hall & O’Sullivan, 1996; Richer & Waugh, 1986). 
War and political instability are not deliberate actions directed at harming the tourism 
industry, but regrettably the effects are the same. 
Apart from these theoretical and empirical works, there are a large number of specific 
case studies showing the negative impacts of terrorist activities (e.g. Neumayer, 2004; 
and Yang & Wong, 2012). Most of them agree that the principal consequences of 
attacks are a decline in traffic and receipts as has been empirically shown in Spain 
(Enders & Sandler, 1991), Norther Ireland (Pizam, 1999), Egypt (Wahab, 1996), China 
(Gartner & Shen, 1992), the United States (Lepp & Gibson, 2003), and of course in the 
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Middle East (Avraham, 2015; Mansfeld and Winckler, 2015) where instability and wars 
have been a constant feature during the last few decades from Libya to Afghanistan. 
Moreover, political violence affects a destination not only contemporaneously but also 
with a lagged effect. Enders & Sandler (1991) and Enders, Sandler & Parise (1992) 
suggest that tourist arrivals can decrease strongly three to nine months after an event, 
when stability has already been restored. However, the tourism industry can recover 
rapidly after the end of the conflict (Fisher, 2003).  
Likewise, studies highlighting the relevance of crime in tourism destinations (e.g. Brunt 
& Hambly, 1999; Korstanje & Clayton, 2012) show that tourism can provoke an 
increase in crime and can provide certain conditions for criminals where the gains from 
crimes against tourists are high and the risks are low. As in the previous cases, adverse 
publicity from the reporting of crime against tourists is shown to have drastic effects on 
subsequent tourist numbers (Brunt & Hambly, 1999). But the impact of instability on 
destinations depends on the degree of risk aversion for tourists (Lepp & Gibson, 2003) 
and the stage of development of destinations (Thompson, 2011).  
One of the most studied topics in this context is the effect that instability has on 
neighboring countries. The literature confirms a substitution effect between destinations 
when political violence or even terrorism is portrayed (Zheng & Martin, 1992; Mansfeld 
& Kliot, 1996). The final effects of terrorism on tourism flows depend mostly on the 
intensity and frequency of attacks (Pizam, & Smith, 2000). So, minor events might 
result in short-term drops in tourism flows to the particular country while major events 
can create a spillover effect with adjacent countries also affected through a loss of 
potential inbound flows (Mansfeld, 1996; Ryan, 1991).  
7 
 
However, despite these findings, authors disagree in how the political instability of a 
country affects neighboring countries in the same region. As pointed out by Beck 
(2014), some authors argue that the detrimental effects on tourism are likely to spill 
over into other countries (Teye, 1986; Ritcher & Waugh, 1986). Others suggest that 
neighboring countries can actually benefit from a substitution effect as long as they are 
not themselves seen as directly affected by the events of violence (Drakos & Kutan, 
2003; Fielding and Shortland, 2011). Conversely, authors supporting the argument that 
terrorism or political violence can either have negative spillover effects on neighboring 
countries in the region or more positive substitution effects are Wall (1996), Lepp & 
Gipson (2003), Frey & Lüchinger (2009) and Enders, Sandler & Parise (1992). The 
basis for these effects is the halo effect that can occur with the perception of risk and 
safety. If a country has a negative image, or is perceived to be unsafe to visit, these 
problems will be attributed to the whole region (Beck, 2014). 
However, based on the Arab countries’ experience, Hazbun (2006) concludes that 
tourism flows are not as vulnerable to political violence as many might assume; and 
even those areas rocked by violence and war have found alternative market niches (such 
as journalists, workers, and business travelers seeking post-war reconstruction 
contracts) to sustain the demand for tourism services. 
But in spite of everything, there is a higher level of agreement among authors with 
respect to the need to manage crises caused by political instability. To avoid the 
negative effects inherited from these situations, destinations should incorporate crisis 
management planning into their overall sustainable development and 
marketing/management strategies to protect and rebuild their image of 
safety/attractiveness, to reassure potential visitors of the safety of the area, to reestablish 
the area’s functionality/attractiveness, and to aid local travel and tourism industry 
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members in their economic recovery (Sönmez, Apostolopoulos & Tarlow, 1999). 
Destination Management Organizations and other stakeholders should play an active 
role in these plans (Paraskevas & Arendell, 2007). 
This paper focuses on the effects of the Arab uprisings on the tourism performance of 
the affected countries using a time series analysis approach. Studying the effects of 
terrorism on the tourism industry based on a time-series analysis is not new. Enders & 
Sandler (1995) advocates the use of time-series analyses to identify cycles, trends, and 
irregular components for forecasting purposes and vector-autoregressions (VAR) with 
respect to the effects of terrorism on tourism. Sloboda (2003) uses an autoregressive 
moving average with explanatory variables (ARMAX) model to carry out a simple 
impact analysis. Yaya, (2008) uses a time series method called the ‘transfer function’ to 
analyze the effect of terrorism on tourism in Turkey. Raza & Jawaid (2013) investigate 
the impact of terrorism activities on tourism in Pakistan by using the annual time series 
data from the period of 1980 to 2010 and a cointegration analysis (Johansen and 
Juselius and autoregressive distributed lag models –ARDL- bound testing procedure), 
confirming a long run relationship between terrorism and tourism. 
3.- Recent development in Mediterranean and Middle East countries.  
The regions of North Africa and Middle East countries have a wealth of heritage, a 
climate conducive to tourism and a range of leisure resources that should provide a 
comparative and competitive advantage to its tourism industry. According to Lanquar 
(2011), the previous two decades antes de la revolución árabe y los acontecimientos 
posteriores, the 11 countries of the Southern Mediterranean (MED11) (Algeria, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and 
Turkey) have recorded the highest growth rates in inbound world tourism. International 
tourist arrivals in MED11 rose by 365% between 1990 and 2010 compared to 214% 
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globally. During the same period, international tourism receipts in the MED11 in 
constant dollars of 2000, increased by 384%, twice as much as the increase of the entire 
world for the same period. The increase was particularly strong in Egypt and Turkey. 
However, according to UNWTO (2015), in 2014, they attracted only 6.2% of 
international tourism arrivals and 4.8 of receipts, what means that region is far from 
fully capitalizing the potential that it holds. En relación a ello, numerous sectoral reports 
agree that South Mediterranean tourism has structural defects, principally the low 
diversity of the tourism offer con una elevada dependencia de Europa, which on average 
account for 60% of international arrivals. Also, it is characterized by a strong 
seasonality (that hinders the development of tourism industries), the absence of 
differentiation and products that are proving to be increasingly out of step with the 
evolution of international tourism which all constitute problematic features (Weigert, 
2012).  
The causes of these defects are rooted in the tourism development model chosen for the 
region. It has taken the shape of self-contained enclaves in the form of coastal resort 
complexes, all-inclusive package tours, or urban hotel complexes providing a range of 
on-site services. Establishments compete on price (rather on quality). As pointed out by 
many authors, this kind of development limits the forms of social and economic 
interaction between tourists and host societies and reduces the contribution of tourist 
spending to the development of the local economy. Likewise, the polarization of 
tourism activity in the coastal areas has aggravated the territorial development 
imbalances to the detriment of the inland areas (Weigert, 2012). 
Tourism development in the Arab region is highly unbalanced: while countries such as 
Algeria or Libya are closed to tourism, other enclaves such as Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt 
and Jordan see tourism as an strategic sector con el que diversificar sus economías más 
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allá del petróleo (Weigert, 2012; Tang and Abosedra, 2014) (see Table 1). Tourism 
receipts account for over 20% of GDP in Lebanon, 12% in Jordan and between 5% and 
8% of GDP in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, (Deutsche Bank Research, 2013), de ahí 
que el impacto de la actual crisis política adquiera tanta importancia para estos países.  
Table 1 about here 
Tal y como se ha mencionado antes, it is need to manage crises caused by political 
instability, but controlling these kind of events and their effects on tourism is not 
completely effective. Feichtinger, Hartl, Kort & Novak (2001) suggest that sometimes a 
cyclical behavior is observed. With regard to the effects of the 9/11 attacks, the tourism 
industry in the Arab World responded to the negative publicity caused by terrorist 
attacks with within-region promotions and marketing tactics. In addition, the potential 
of developing “Islamic tourism” received more serious discussion (Al-Hamarneh & 
Steiner, 2004). 
Contrary to some assumptions, the universal collapse of the tourism industry in Arab 
countries that was predicted after the attacks did not take place (Al-Hamarneh & 
Steiner, 2004). The 9/11 attacks and the “global war on terror” resulted in a decline in 
tourism in the Middle East region: over the course of 2001, worldwide arrivals declined 
by 0.5%, while across the Arab Middle East tourist arrivals fell by 1.3%. This decline 
followed two years of double-digit growth and high expectations for the sector across 
the region. However, in 2004, most of the region quickly rebounded from the 15% drop 
in arrivals for the second quarter of 2003 with a 17% increase (Hazbun, 2006). 
Sin embargo, los recientes acontecimientos que están teniendo lugar en Oriente 
Próximo muestran síntomas mucho más preocupantes, ya que la crisis política se está 
viviendo in situ. La inestabilidad que siguió a the Arab Spring uprising had a significant 
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impact on economic and tourism activity in North Africa. According to Deutsche Bank 
Research (2013), average real GDP growth in the region fell from 4.2% in 2010 to 2.2% 
in 2011, its lowest level in a decade. The slowdown affected hardest in countries such as 
Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Yemen, protagonistas de los cambios politicos más 
importantes de la región. Only Morocco maintained a low growth in its GDP during 
2011. In 2013 the GDP growth rates remained below the pre-revolutionary levels.  
En relación al tuirsmo, the number of tourist arrivals in the five main destinations in the 
region –Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Lebanon – fell by a quarter, from 20 
million in H1 2010 to 15 million in H1 2011, especialmente in Egypt and Tunisia, by 
about 40% each. A pesar de los problemas de competitividad de la zona remarcados 
antes, en los últimos años la verdadera responsable de la crisis y la ausencia de 
eficiencia turística es la inestabilidad política, tal y como destaca Morakabati (2013). 
La reducción de visitantes y gasto turístico en los países árabes coincide con resultados 
turísticos muy positivos en otros países Mediterráneos como Grecia, Turquía y 
especialmente España (Figures 1), que cada año supera sus cifras. Although tourism is a 
very resilient industry, political instability (including wars, terrorism or crime) usually 
has a negative impact on the tourism flows of directly affected countries. Neighboring 
countries can be positively or negatively affected depending on the predominance of a 
spillover or substitution effect. As a result, losers and winners emerge as a consequence 
of these events.  
Apart from this short-term effect on tourist arrivals, long-term effects derived from 
investment-flows are observed. For example, the presence of Spanish international hotel 
chains in North African countries (see Table 2) has been seriously affected by instability 
in the area. 
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Figure 1 about here. 
Table 2 about here 
Dados estos precedentes y la evolución turística en la region árabe, se hace neceario 
analizar el verdadero impacto en términos de flujos turísticos de todos los 
acontecimientos que sucedieron a la Primavera Árabe.  
4.-Methodology and data. 
As explained in the introduction, to determine the impact of the uprisings on tourist 
arrivals in selected countries, we have used a Bayesian Structural Time-Series Models 
framework proposed by Brodersen, et al. (2015) and implemented in the CausalImpact 
R-package. (R-Core-Team, 2015). 
Structural time-series models can be defined in terms of a pair of equations: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑍𝑡
𝑇𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (1) 
𝛼𝑡+1 = 𝑇𝑡𝛼𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡𝜂𝑡  (2) 
Where  𝑦𝑡 is a scalar observation, Zt a d-dimensional output vector, Tt is d x d transition 
matrix, Rt is a d x q control matrix,   𝜀𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑡
2)  is a scalar observation error with 
noise variance σt and 𝜂𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝑄𝑡) is a q-dimensional system error with a q x q state-
diffusion matrix Qt where q ≤ d that are independent of all other unknowns. Equation 
(1) is the observation equation: it links the observed data 𝑦𝑡 to a latent evolution of the 
state vector 𝛼𝑡. Equation (2) is the state equation; it governs the evolution of the state 
vector 𝛼𝑡 through time.  
Structural time-series models are flexible - a very class of models, including all 
autoregressive integrated moving average models ARIMA models can be written in the 
state-space form given by (1) and (2) - and modular – the latent states as well as the 
13 
 
associated model matrices Zt, Tt, Rt and Qt can be assembled from a library of 
component sub-models to capture important features of the data as trend, seasonality or 
effects of holidays, etc. - (Brodersen, et al., 2015). 
The most important state component of this approach is a regression component that 
allows to create counterfactual predictions by constructing a synthetic control based on 
a combination of markets that were not treated (i.e. a crucial assumption of this 
approach is that covariates –countries used as controls - are unaffected, in our case, by 
the effects of Arab uprisings). This represents an advantage with respect to intervention 
analysis using solely ARIMA models due to that last methodology only takes into 
account the evolution of the target country under consideration before and after the 
event without these controls. However, esto no significa que los modelos ARIMA no 
sean útiles en este contexto, pues de hecho ARIMA estimations are also performed in 
this paper in order to pre-test the adequacy of a set of potential control countries and to 
check the robustness of the obtained results. 
With regard to this regression component, static or dynamic regression could be used to 
estimate the impact of an event. When the relationship between the controls and treated 
units has been stable in the past, static coefficients are more suitable. Meanwhile, 
dynamic coefficients are useful when the linear relationship between treated metrics and 
controls is believed to change over time (Brodersen, et al. 2015). 
Regarding to inference and estimations, a Bayesian approach is used. In a nutshell 
causal impact is estimated by subtracting the predicted response obtained from a 
semiparametric Bayesian posterior estimation and the observed response during the 
post-intervention (Brodersen, et al. 2015). 
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Let θ generally denote the set of all model parameters and let 𝛼 = (𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑚) denote 
the full state sequence. First, a prior distribution of the parameters p(θ) as well as a 
distribution 𝑝(𝛼0|𝜃) on the initial state values is established using the Gamma 
distribution and a spike-and-slab prior over coefficients when many potential controls 
exists.  
Second, posterior distribution of the counterfactual time series given the value of the 
target series in the pre-intervention period is constructed along with the values of the 
controls in the post-intervention period. To this end, draws of the model parameters θ 
and the state vector 𝛼 are simulated for the training period using Gibbs sampler and the 
observed data y1:n. The sampler simulates a sequence (𝜃 , 𝛼)(1), (𝜃 , 𝛼)(2) ,…from a 
Markov chain whose stationary distribution is 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦1:𝑛 , 𝛼). The sampler alternates 
between a data-augmentation step that simulates from 𝑝(𝛼|𝑦1:𝑛 , 𝜃) and a parameter-
simulation step that simulates from 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦1:𝑛 , 𝛼).  
Third, posterior simulations are performed from the posterior predictive distribution 
𝑝(?̃?𝑛+1:𝑚|𝑦1:𝑛 , 𝑥1:𝑚) over the counterfactual time series ?̃?𝑛+1:𝑚 given the observed pre-
intervention activity y1:n. The posterior predictive density is defined as a coherent (joint) 
distribution over all counterfactual data points, rather than as a collection of pointwise 
univariate distributions. 
Finally, samples from the posterior predictive distribution over the counterfactual 
activity can be used to obtain samples from the posterior causal effect. For each draw 
𝜏 and for each time point t=n+1,…,m, we set  𝜙𝑡
(𝜏:)
: = 𝑦𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡
(𝜏)
, yielding samples from 
the approximate posterior predictive density of the effect attributes to the intervention. 
In this paper we analyze the impact of the Arab uprisings on tourism destinations using 
a two-step methodology (see Figure 2) and annual data provided by the World Travel 
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Organization (several Compendiums to complete the period 1980-1995 have been used) 
and the World Bank (2015) for the period 1980-2014 (35 annual observations).  
Figure 2 about here 
In the first step, to establish the set of suitable countries used for control purposes in the 
causal analysis (i.e. to introduce their international tourist arrivals in the regression 
component of the models as benchmark), we performed an analysis of single time series 
using ARIMA methods. This let us to check if countries appear to be affected by Arab 
uprisings or not. Any country with appearance to be affected by events are discarded as 
potential control in the second step. 
To perform ARIMA estimations, we used the Hyndman & Khandakar (2008) algorithm 
implemented in the forecast R-package (Hyndman, 2015). Specifically, we split each 
series into two periods. Data until 2009 was used to forecast the individual behavior of 
each country for the period 2010-2014. Then, we compared predicted and real values of 
the series beyond 2010. Countries where forecasts and the reality in the period 2010-
2014 are more closely matched are suspected to be less affected by uprisings and are 
considered as suitable to be used as controls in the second step where impact by causal 
analysis is estimated.  
The potential countries initially considered as controls were France, Italy, Brazil, 
Mexico, Dominican Republic and the entire World (see Figure 3). World evolution was 
used as a reflection of the industry as a whole. Brazil, Mexico and Dominican 
Republican were considered because they compete in the same product (sun and beach) 
as some of the analyzed destinations with a predominance of all-inclusive resorts, such 
as Tunisia, Egypt or Turkey and have not been affected by the uprisings. Finally, France 
and Italy were considered because they are also Mediterranean destinations, have 
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similar degrees of maturity as Spain or Greece, and appear to have been less affected by 
the Arab uprisings than other Mediterranean countries.  
In the second step, we estimated the impact of the uprisings on international tourist 
arrivals in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Greece, Turkey and Spain controlling for the 
countries identified in the first step. As explained before, the event is located in 2010, 
thus we split the sample in two periods. Data up until 2009 was used to create the 
counterfactual scenario and data between 2010 and 2014 was used to estimate the 
impact. In line with Brodersen et al. (2015), we used the static regression option to 
reduce overfitting problems. The next section describes the econometric estimations. 
Figure 3 about here 
5.-Econometric analysis and results 
Figure 4 and 5 represent Step 1 of our methodology. Figure 4 shows the estimated 
ARIMA model for each country using the data until 2009. The dashed line represents 
the forecast and the solid line represents the realization of the series during the period 
2010-2014. As we can see, in principle the uprisings have had a negative effect in 
Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey (realization lines below their self-predictions), and a positive 
effect in the rest of the analyzed countries. In Morocco, the two lines are practically 
matched for the whole period with 2012 being an inflection point. In Spain, a change in 
trend is also observed in 2012 when the distance between two lines increases. Greece, 
despite its economic problems, also experienced a sharp increase in the distance 
between the predicted and realized values of the series after 2012.  
Regarding these last two countries, it should be noted that especially Greece, went 
through internal devaluations during this period as an imposition of the Troika. Thus, 
probably part of the attractiveness of Greek and in a lesser extent Spanish tourism at the 
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time comes from the increase in competitiveness via decreased costs and not only from 
the uprisings in competitors.  
Figure 4 about here 
Table 3 summarizes the impact on each Mediterranean country analyzed based on 
pointwise forecasts and realizations of each series for the 2010-2014 period using the 
ARIMA models. We can see that Egypt (-23.81%) and Tunisia (-21.24%) are the 
countries most negatively affected by the uprisings. Turkey (-14.39%) also experienced 
a decline with respect to its expectations. Conversely, Greece (+8.89%), Spain 
(+5.95%) and Morocco (+4.14%) benefited from the instability.  
With regard to the potential controls (Figure 5), France and Italy seem to be the most 
suitable countries because the realization of their series between 2010 and 2014 
perfectly match their expectations for this period. Mexico, except for years 2013 and 
2014, also exhibits good behavior. Conversely, Brazil, Dominican Republic and the 
World as a whole outperform their expectations.  
Table 3 about here 
Figure 5 about here 
After establishing the set of potential countries as controls, we performed the impact 
analysis. Table 4 summarizes the results obtained. The first column of the table shows 
the ARIMA estimations (shown in the last two columns of Table 3) to facilitate the 
comparison between the results obtained using the two methodologies. Each cell of the 
columns 2 to 5 of the table contains the absolute cumulative impact during the whole 
period 2010-2014 (first digit), the relative cumulative impact (middle digit) and the 95 




The results confirm that the set of countries used as a control is crucial for impact 
estimations. In general, in terms of the affected countries, this methodology captures the 
decline of arrivals in Tunisia better than in Egypt. With respect to the unaffected 
countries, the methodology captures better the positive impact of the uprisings in 
Morocco and Turkey than in Spain and Greece. 
Focusing on the directly affected countries, comparing columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, we 
can see that the Brodersen et al (2015) methodology controlling for the World evolution 
results produces a negative impact for Tunisia (-27%) that is higher than that estimated 
by its ARIMA model (-21.24%). A higher negative impact is also obtained controlling 
for the World, Mexico and Dominican Republic (column 3). In both cases, the impact is 
significant (the zero does not belong in the confidence interval). Conversely, the impact 
for Egypt (-6.5% in column 2 and -15% in column 3) is lower than its ARIMA model (-
23.81%) and lacks statistical significance.    
With respect to the control countries representing the evolution of the Mediterranean 
area (France and Italy), for Tunisia we obtained a lower impact (-12% in column 4) than 
in the previous cases and with respect to its ARIMA model, and no credible positive 
effect is obtained for Egypt. But in both cases the results obtained lack statistical 
significance.   
Finally, the last column shows the estimated impact using a combination of the 
evolution of the sand and beach resort destinations (reflected by Mexico and Dominican 
Republic) and the evolution of the Mediterranean area represented by France and Italy. 
In this case, a significant negative impact (-21%) matching the results obtained with its 
ARIMA model is observed for Tunisia. Conversely, in the case of Egypt, a lower (-




Table 4 about here 
Figure 6 and 7 show the impact on Tunisia and Egypt respectively controlling for the 
World tourism evolution. The first panel shows the data and a counterfactual prediction 
for the post-treatment period. The second panel shows the difference between observed 
data and counterfactual predictions. This is the pointwise causal effect, as estimated by 
the model. The third panel adds up the pointwise contributions from the second panel, 
resulting in a plot of the cumulative effect of the intervention (Brodersen et al, 2015). 
 
Figure 6 and 7 about here 
 
The results for the indirectly affected countries are less clear than those for the directly 
affected ones. For Morocco the impact using the Brodersen et al. (2015) methodology 
is, in all cases (ranging from +20 in column 3 to +48 per cent in column 4), higher than 
estimated by its ARIMA model. This positive impact is statistically significant 
regardless of the countries introduced in the regressions. For Turkey, contrary to the 
negative impact obtained with its ARIMA model, a positive impact ranging from +27% 
in column 1 to +50% in column 4 (the +15% in column 3 lacks significance) of the 
uprisings is now estimated.  
Meanwhile, the results for countries located on the northern shores of the Mediterranean 
are even more confusing. In fact, no significant impact is estimated for Greece and 
Spain in the whole Table. In both countries, the only estimation that results in a positive 
impact of the Arab uprisings on their tourism flows is obtained using France and Italy as 
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controls (column 4). But this positive impact lacks statistical significance. Moreover, 
controlling for the World evolution in the case of Spain results in a statically significant 
negative (-10%) impact of the uprisings for this country, which is highly suspicious. 
Likewise, all estimations for both countries in Table 4 are very different to those 
obtained by their ARIMA models.  
The unexpected negative impact using the World as a comparison framework for Spain 
and Greece could be attributable to the higher degree of maturity of these countries in 
the international tourism market and the impossibility of them reaching the growth rates 
of other emerging destinations. The declining trend in their shares of the international 
tourism market would be proof of this behavior. In this sense, we think that the most 
realistic impact for both countries is that obtained when France and Italy are included in 
the regression, as reflected in column 4 of Table 4. However, as previously mentioned, 
the positive impact estimated in this case lacks statistical significance.   
Another plausible explanation for the lack of a positive and statistically significant 
impact on Spain and Greece could be the concurrence of the Arab events with the 
profound economic crises in these two countries, which could be acting as a 
confounding factor, affecting the result of estimations. But these two effects cannot be 
separated using the Brodersen et al. (2015) procedure.  
6.-Conclusion. 
In general the Arab Spring opens a debate on whether the nascent democracy it has 
spawned at least in Tunisia and Egypt, and the reforms it has induced elsewhere, might 
reverse previous vicious circle to virtuous cycles facilitating industrialization. 
Following Springbor (2011), the key question is: Might the Arab Spring convert the 
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vicious cycle into a virtuous cycle of interaction between economics and politics in 
Arab countries? 
Observando el nacimiento de la Primavera Árabe, one of the critical economic lessons 
of the last decade has been that it is not growth per se but the type of growth that 
matters (Malik & Awadallah, 2013). The hoped-for trickle-down effect of such growth 
either failed to materialize or was not sufficiently robust to prevent the widespread and 
deepening disillusionment and unrest (Hassan, 2011). The crisis of the Arab Spring 
revealed the obsolescence of the tourism development model in the region, based on 
both social authoritarianism and a disconnected territorial offer, where tourists do not 
encounter the socioeconomic and political conditions experienced by the local 
populations. For these reasons, authors such as Weigert (2012) suggest that this kind of 
tourism probably will not survive the process of democratization triggered by the Arab 
revolutions, giving rise to positive perspectives for the advent of a better tourism 
development based on sustainable principles.  
In this paper we have analyzed the effects of the Arab uprisings y los acontecimientos 
posteriores on the tourism destinations along the Mediterranean coastline. International 
tourist arrivals in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Spain and Greece have been 
modeled using ARIMA methods and a Bayesian Structural Time-Series procedure 
proposed by Brodersen et al (2015).  
Econometric estimations performed in section 4 have shown that the uprisings have had 
a clear impact on the international tourism flows in directly affected countries. In 
Tunisia, both the ARIMA and Brodersen et al. (2015) procedures lead to the same 
conclusion: a negative impact in terms of tourism of Arab uprisings in this country. In 
the case of Egypt, although the estimations mostly show a negative point-estimate of the 
impact of the events, the result is less clear as the estimations lack statistical 
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significance. In any case, despite the potential doubts about Egypt, it seems clear that 
both countries would be losers in terms of a reduction in their tourism competitiveness 
provoked by the uprisings. Otros perdedores serían claramente Siria y Libia –donde las 
situaciones de guerra han provocado que el último dato reportado haga referencia a 
2011 y 2008 respectivamente-, y en menor medida Líbano y Jordania –que también 
viene experimentando estancamientos o reducciones en el número de llegadas desde los 
inicios de los eventos-.  
With regard to potential winners, Morocco and Turkey appear to be the countries that 
have most benefited from the Arab uprisings. In both countries, the Brodersen et al. 
(2015) methodology leads to the conclusion that the uprisings have had a positive 
impact on tourism competitiveness. In the case of Turkey, the result of the afore-
mentioned methodology contradict those obtained using the preferred ARIMA model. 
But results in Table 4 for this country are robust irrespective of the countries used as 
controls. As a practical implication of this result, it is worth noting that both countries 
belong to the North African region or near it, thus we could conclude that the potential 
spillover effect, negatively affecting neighboring countries has not been observed 
during the Arab uprisings. Conversely, a deviation effect appears to be clearer.  
Israel - que no ha sido analizado en este artículo- también parece ser otro de los 
ganadores en este contexto, habida cuenta los resultados positivos que viene observando 
en términos de llegadas internacionales. En cualquier caso, It would be interesting to 
continue this study analyzing the effects on tourism in non-Mediterranean neighboring 
countries, especially the United Arab Emirates. 
The effects of the uprisings on Spain and Greece are less clear and a comparison with 
countries in the same stage of tourism development is needed to obtain a positive 
impact of the uprisings on their tourism flows. Moreover, when obtained, the positive 
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impact is not significant from a statistical viewpoint. This does not mean that Spain and 
Greece have not benefited from the Arab uprisings. As we can see in column 4 of Table 
4, the upper limit of confidence intervals for both countries suggests that until a relative 
positive impact of +17 per cent for the case of Greece and +14 per cent for the case of 
Spain there is compatibility with the available data. In this sense, it is well-known that 
some Spanish tourism destinations such as the Balearic and Canary Islands have 
received many tourists diverted by tour-operators from Tunisia and Egypt. However, the 
Brodersen et al (2015) methodology using the aggregate data for whole countries, which 
has been done in this paper, has not been able to capture the deviation effect on these 
countries with more clarity. This represents one of the limitations of this study. 
Other limitations of this paper are that it focuses only on tourism arrivals and the limited 
set of countries used as controls. Probably, the use of a broader range of countries could 
generate better estimations of the impact and narrow confidence intervals. International 
tourism arrivals data from 1995 to 2013 are available for many countries in the World 
Bank database. So, it would be possible to reproduce and refine this study by 
introducing a broader set of countries in the regressions. Also, analyzing a broader set 
of variables such as tourism receipts or direct investment flows could improve the 
perception of the impact of uprisings on tourism industry. Both of these tasks are 
recommended for future research. 
Furthermore, another line of future research would be to check the robustness of the 
analysis performed using other techniques within the time series framework or any 
other econometric procedure. Likewise, apart from this kind quantitative analysis of the 
impacts of the uprisings, a qualitative analysis of the consequences of the uprisings is 
needed. As reflected in the introduction and literature review, some authors consider 
that the Arab Spring has represented a deep change in Arab societies, opening up 
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opportunities to change the tourism development model of the affected countries 
towards a new tourism based on more sustainable principles. These qualitative changes 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: International Tourism Arrivals Mediterranean countries.  
 


















































Step 1: Determine countries to be used as control  
Hyndman & Khandakar (2008) 
1.1.-Estimate ARIMA model for each series using data from 1980 to 2009 
1.2-Forecast ARIMA model for the period 2010-2014 
1.3.-Compare predictions and the real behavior of the series  
1.4.-Countries where predictions and real behavior are most closely matched are 
considered as suitable controls 
Step 2: Determine the impact of the Arab Spring Event (Brodersen et al., 2015) 
2.1-Fix the event in 2010 
2.2.-Estimate the counterfactual using international tourists arrivals data from 1980 to 
2009 for the target country and the countries selected as control in the regression 
component. 
2.3-Estimate the impact by subtracting the real behavior of the series from 2010 to 2014 




Figure 3: International Tourist Arrivals 2010-2014. Potential countries used as controls 
in the impact analysis. 
 




















Figure 4: Analyzed Countries, Predicted and Real International Tourist Arrivals 2010-
2014. ARIMA models. 
 























Figure 5: Potential Controls, Predicted and Real International Tourist Arrivals 2010-
2014. ARIMA models. 
 


















Figure 6: Arab Spring impact on tourism flows in Tunisia controlled for World 
evolution. 
 
Source: CausalImpact R-package output. Note: x axis, observation 30 corresponds to year 2010. Upper 
panel shows the tourism flows (solid line) and the counterfactual prediction after Arab uprisings (dashed 
line). Middle panel shows the pointwise causal effect, i.e difference between observed arrivals and 
counterfactual predictions. Bottom panel plots the cumulative effect adding up the pointwise 






















Figure 7: Arab Spring impact on tourism flows in Egypt controlled for World evolution. 
 
Source: CausalImpact R-package output. Note: x axis, observation 30 corresponds to year 2010. Upper 
panel shows the tourism flows (solid line) and the counterfactual prediction after Arab uprisings (dashed 
line). Middle panel shows the pointwise causal effect, i.e difference between observed arrivals and 
counterfactual predictions. Bottom panel plots the cumulative effect adding up the pointwise 


















Table 1: Macroeconomic relevance of the tourism in MED economies, 2013-2014 
Countries % of tourism and 

























Algeria* 8.0 7.1 55 11 
Egypt 12.8 11.6 31 61 
Israel 7.3 7.8 46 119 
Jordan 20.3 17.9 69 34 
Lebanon 21.1 20.3 63 32 
Libya 6.7 4.4 89 153 
Morocco 17.9 16.0 49 39 
Syria* 10.6 7.8 93 74 
Tunisia 15.2 13.9 71 48 
Turkey* 12.3 9.1 14 63 
*2013. Source. World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC). Travel and Tourism Economic Impact, 












Table 2: Number of hotels and rooms of Spanish International Hotel Chains. 
 
2010 2014 Variation 10/14 
Country Hotels Rooms Hotels  Rooms Hotels Rooms 
Tunisia 32 9,402 22 7,249 -31,25 -22,90 
Morocco 10 3,665 12 3,927 20 7,15 
Egypt 5 980 7 2,005 40 104,59 
Turkey 8 2,433 7 2,126 -12,5 -12,62 
North Africa 55 16,480 48 15,307 -12,73 -7,12 
Other countries 846 21,6196 835 21,7726 -1,30 0,71 
World (except 
Spain) 901 23,2676 883 23,3033 -2,00 0,15 



































(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tunisia 38062 29.976 -8.086 -21.24% 
Egypt 70.281 53.546 -16.735 -23.81% 
Morocco 46.408 48.333 +1.925 +4.14% 
Greece 79.808 86.905 +7.097 +8.89% 
Turkey 209.546 179.392 -30.154 -14.39% 
Spain 275.773 292.201 +16.428 +5.95% 































Analysis using CausalImpact (Brodersen et al, 2015) 





































































































Authors own elaboration. First row cumulative 2010-2014 absolute effect. Second row cumulative 
relative effect. Third row 95% posterior confidence interval of cumulative relative effect.  
 
